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The aim of this paper is to explore and recommend a rational basis for setting up a retention regime for a 
given project. Despite a century of practice, there is no theory to provide guidance yet. Using insights 
gained from the recently developed theories on monetary retentions, this study argues that retention 
regimes should be designed to cater for the needs of those who have the power to control. Citing this as 
an important discovery, the study focuses on public clients and proposes three main objectives to be 
achieved and a tentative methodology for doing so in the pursuit of knowledge on how to set up a 
retention regime to cater for a wide variety of needs. 
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There has been much debate and discussion on the merits and demerits of retentions (Fullerton, 2000; 
Abeysekera, 2002) and some countries such as the USA have abolished its use (only in public contracts of 
some states though) whereas in other countries such as the UK they have tried and failed to abolish 
retentions (House of Commons, 2003). However, others seem to find it useful and are content with the 
status-quo. Despite its extensive use for well over a century, originally enforced by law in New Zealand 
as far back as 1897 and later abolished in 1987 (almost a century later) there is still a lack of 
understanding on a rational basis for setting up retention regimes. This is not surprising given that there 
have hardly been any attempts to build theory in the field of construction management. However, 
Abeysekera (2008) attempted to develop five theories on monetary retentions using a metaphorical 
approach which are described briefly in this paper. Though these theories provide interesting insights on 
various issues, they fall short in providing a theoretical basis for setting up retention regimes. Thus, the 
aim of this paper is to pursue this journey by developing a conceptual basis for doing so. 
 
 
2. Introduction to Theory 
 
In engineering, ‘theory’ is the foundation for many applications whether it is in the design and 
construction of a bridge, a building, or a road. Many codes of practice for design of structures for 
example, are based on theoretical knowledge. In this regard, those with a background in engineering 
would find it easy to see the relevance of ‘theory’ and its value. If not for theory, one would have to use 
experience, intuition, and judgement instead, to create the built environment we live in, no doubt, with 




In common usage, the word ‘theory’ is often used to signify an opinion as in “he has a theory that wearing 
hats makes men go bald”.  In fact, most seem to have theories about many things including how to 
‘choose a bait, a date, or mate’ as eloquently put by Shoemaker et al (2004). In this usage, theory is not 
necessarily based on facts; and is not required to be consistent with true descriptions of reality. Such 
usage of the term ‘theory’ is confusing, incorrect and inappropriate. However, this usage shows us that 
theory helps us to know, and is also about knowing, but this is not enough; it must work in practice too. 
However, knowing is much more than this too. The ancient astronomers made excellent predictions of the 
future positions of planets but they were unable to say why (understanding) the planets behaved this way 
because they lacked understanding (Meredith, 1998). So, theory is of a particular kind of knowing which 
goes beyond knowing how to practice. Moreover, it is very much more than other ways of knowing such 
as authority, intuition, and experience, whereby logic (reason) needs to be applied to questions for right 
understanding (Shoemaker et al., 2004).  
 
Theory consists of answers to four elements, namely, ‘what, how, why and so-what’. The what identifies 
the phenomena, the how provides explanation (and prediction) and the why provides understanding whilst 
the so-what element is necessary to demonstrate the implications and consequences of a proposed theory. 
Other elements to include are responses to when, where, who, which are considered to be the limiting 
parameters i.e. the context (Abeysekera, 2008a).  
 
Finally, if as noted before theory should respond to the questions of ‘what, how, why and so-what’ in 
relation to phenomena, how does one judge or evaluate theory? Shoemaker et al. (2004) provide ten 
criteria, namely, testability, falsifiability (i.e. capability of being criticised by observational reports), 
parsimony (least complex explanation for an observation), explanatory power, predictive power, scope, 
cumulative nature, degree of formal development, heuristic value (generate ideas for research), and 
aesthetics (expressing the value of a theory by the application of aesthetic principles such as by referring 
to an idea as “beautiful”) whilst noting that it is unlikely that all these criteria can be fulfilled 
simultaneously. 
 
The beginning point of building theory would be a problem (Shoemaker et al., 2004). Problems could be 
intellectual in nature or practical problems, or a combination of both. Concepts (such as ‘retentions’) 
could also be a starting point for theory building particularly if they are problematic. Such concepts could 
lead to hypotheses which could be tested for validity and thereby provide greater understanding. It is also 
possible that theory building could start with a hypothesis or even with a question about something that 
needs better understanding. Another possible beginning point for building theory would be to start with 
an area in which theory is vague or lacking. This is clearly the case with ‘monetary retentions’. 
 
 
3. Theories on Monetary Retentions  
 
“Actions without thinking, practice without theory are unimaginable...” (Miettinen, 2001) 
 
 
Abeysekera (2008a) discussed the experience of moving from engineering to a practice-driven profession 
like construction management wherein he noted that there are hardly any theories to inform practice. The 
situation is not much different today: educational curricula in construction management rarely if ever 
focus on theory. Part of the problem is that there has not been an attempt to differentiate practice with 
scientific practice. Moreover, neither has there been an attempt to build theory nor appreciate the need.  
 
Having explored different methodologies for building theory on monetary retentions, Abeysekera (2008a) 
experimented with the use of metaphor as it was found to be a convenient and a powerful approach for 
channelling knowledge, give it structure, and develop a narrative, in a way that it condensed knowledge 
and facilitated practice. Accordingly, five theories were presented under Images of Retentions – an 
unfolding story about the practice of retention. These theories were named as Cash-Cow, Steroid, Beast, 
 
 
Stress, and Chaos. They were seen as providing a deeper understanding of the reasons for this 
phenomenon along with new insights on retentions. 
 
Individually, these ‘theories’ tell us a one-sided story by highlighting certain interpretations and forcing 
others to the background. This needs to be understood but importantly these theories needs to be viewed 
together as a collection rather than in isolation, understanding the opposing and complementary points of 
view, along with their interactions.  The theory (and theories) presented therein are not exhaustive as 
noted by Abeysekera (2008a). In fact, there are still a number of issues pertaining to retentions that need 




4. Retention Regimes and Underlying Assumptions  
 
The original purpose of retentions in New Zealand (NZ) as set out in the 1897 Act was to protect 
subcontractors (payee). With the abolition of the Act in 1987 (almost a century after), the role of 
retentions has reversed from protecting the payee to protecting the payer and the practice has continued 
unabated (Abeysekera, 2003). The amount of money held varies but it is not uncommon in NZ to hold 
back sums of money as a high as 10% of the contract price particularly from trade contractors. Only a part 
is reimbursed on completion (usually about half is held back) and the balance released only at the end of 
the defects liability period which usually varies from 3 months to a year. As to why such percentages 
have been used is a mystery as there does not seem to be any guidance on this matter. 
 
Retentions are not only held by clients but also by contractors when they make payments to 
subcontractors. If the payer goes bankrupt, the payee stand to lose all their moneys as it is highly unusual 
for the payer to provide a payment guarantee. Thus the quantum of money withheld is an important 
concern for payees. The greater the amount of money held by the payer, the greater is the risk for the 
payee. Whether the quantum of money held is a reasonable reflection of the risks involved is unknown as 
payers do not seem to distinguish between risky and non-risky contractors (or subcontractors) treating 
them alike (Abeysekera, 2008a)! This is wasteful and is not value-adding. Moreover, greater the money 
held, greater is the impact on their cash flows: On the one hand, the payer benefits by withholding 
payments as they pay less and minimise their financing costs (Abeysekera, 2005). On the other hand, the 
payee incurs extra costs sourcing funds from private financiers. In recessionary economic conditions the 
impact could be devastating with diminishing lines of work in capital (Bill, 2009). Thus the amount of 
money held should be a thoughtful decision for an efficient industry and not an arbitrary one. 
Nevertheless, examination into current practice in New Zealand reveals otherwise! 
 
4.1 Sliding Retention Regimes 
 
One of the commonest retention regimes used in NZ with respect to the work done by main contractors is 
shown in Figure 1 whereby 10% is retained on the first $200,000 and 5% on the next $800,000, and a 
further 1.75% thereafter with a ceiling of $200,000 (NZS 3910: 1998). The dollar limit works out to a 
threshold contract price of NZ $ 9M, which is an ‘effective rate’ of just 2.22%. Clearly, the effective rate 
will decline further as the value of the project increases. This is one of regimes specified in NZS 3910 
and interestingly this is the regime that was enforced by law at the time the Liens Act was abolished in 
1987. This may be referred to as a sliding regime as the effective rate of retention reduces with the size of 
project. Interestingly, it is a unique retention regime used nowhere else but in New Zealand. As such, it 
needs a deeper investigation to understand the reasons behind the use of such a regime.   
 
In the setting up of the sliding regime mentioned earlier, it appears that those who conceived it might 




• Retention rates should vary according to the size of the project; smaller projects need higher 
retention rates than larger projects (10% for 200k project as against 6% for 1M project and 
2.22% for 9M project). 
• Retention rates should not be differentiated within certain values of work (up to 200k, 10%; 
from 200k to 1m, 5% etc.). 
• Retentions should be recovered at a faster rate initially and at a lesser rate later. 
• As the size of the project increases, the drop in rates should be higher with low value projects 
than higher value projects (a drop of 4% from 200k to 1M as against a similar drop from 1M 
to 6M). 
• Retention rates should be a constant within certain bands 
• Total amount of retentions should be capped at $200,000 and not increase with the size of the 
project. 
• The limit of retentions and  the value of work for the first tier of retentions should be the 
same (i.e. 10% for projects less than 200k with a similar retention limit) 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 
Figure 1: A common retention regime in New Zealand (Source: Abeysekera, 2006) 
 
The assumptions mentioned above are intriguing and challenges the academic and the practitioner 
community to think whether there has been any rational basis for such a decision. Interestingly, 
investigations into some projects executed during the last decade revealed that those who commission 
projects have adopted various retention regimes as shown in Table 1. Interestingly, these regimes fall 
broadly into two categories, namely sliding and flat with each regime showing similar characteristics. 
 
4.2 Flat Retention Regimes 
 
Compared with sliding regimes, flat regimes are more common wherein the rate applied remains the same 
for all payments. However, retentions seem to be recovered faster in the Britomart project similar to the 
sliding retention regimes although the limit seems to be specified as a percentage than as a dollar limit. 
The reasons for these and other decisions are unknown, and whether in fact, they have been made with a 
good understanding of the real needs is questionable as there are no available guidelines on how to set up 




Further investigations will be necessary to see whether the rates should vary depending on project size or 
due to other factors, and the impact of such rates on industry efficiency. As mentioned before, what is not 
clear is the basis on which these have been set up as mentioned before. Moreover, as to whether a sliding 
regime or a flat regime or for that matter a hybrid regime is better for industry (in terms of improving 
efficiency) also needs investigation. 
 
Table 1: Projects with different retention regimes in New Zealand 
 
Project Retention Regime Type of regime 
Auckland International 
Airport 
NZ 3910 sliding regime (see Fig. 1) Sliding 
Britomart - $100 M 10% on first $15M + 5% on next 30M + 2.5% 
thereafter. Limit of retention $ 3.5M.  
Defects liability retention 50% from last separable 
portion 
Sliding 
Britomart Chief Post 
Office ($25M) 
Retention rate 10%, Limit of retention 5%, Defects 
liability retention 50% from last separable portion 
Flat 
Air NZ Simulators (two 
projects each $ 4M) 
5% of Contract Price with a limit of $125,000. 




4.3 Retention Regimes for the Defects Liability Period 
 
Retention regimes have different elements: Discussions thus far has centred on rates, limits and forms of 
retentions (recovery and reimbursement forms) focussing on the ‘construction period’ (i.e. before 
handover for occupation) but not on the contractual defects liability period (which starts after the project 
is taken over). The retention regime for this period seems to be quite different to the ‘construction period’. 
Interestingly, retention held is only a fraction of the amount held during construction and is usually 
around 50-60%. As to why this is so is intriguing and whether in fact this is due to a reduction in risks by 
a similar proportion is also unknown. Some of underlying assumptions for such thinking seems to stem 
from different perceptions on defect liability retention: 
 
• Risks (of defects) remain constant during the defects liability period 
• Risk of defects are larger with larger projects (use of retention rates) 
• Risk of defects can be limited to a dollar value (when limit is specified in dollar terms)  
• Retentions should be held over a period of 3 to 12 months. 
Once again, it is not clear the basis for such assumptions including which of these assumptions have a 
negative impact on industry efficiency, and to what extent, are also unknown.  
 
 
5. Retention Regimes and Impacting Issues 
 
There are many factors that seem to impact on retention regimes including the impact retention regimes 
have on users (clients, contractors, subcontractors etc). Type and size of projects, industry characteristics, 




5.1 Impact on Costs 
 
Greater the money held, greater is the impact on cash flows: On the one hand, the payer benefits by 
withholding payments as they pay less and minimise their financing costs. On the other hand, the payee 
incurs extra costs sourcing funds from private financiers. In recessionary economic conditions the impact 
could be devastating with diminishing lines of work in capital (Bill, 2009). Thus the amount of money 
held should be a thoughtful decision for an efficient industry and not be an arbitrary one. 
  
5.2 Double Dipping  
 
Not only do clients hold retentions from contractors but contractors too do so when they make payments 
to subcontractors. This duplication seems wasteful although large scale contractors use this practice to 
create a large pool of surplus money to the extent that they would not need commercial banks to provide 
lines of credit for construction work (Abeysekera, 2006). In other words, retentions act as a cash cow for 
main contractors who outsource their work (Abeysekera, 2008a). Thus for some contractors this 
duplication seems to add value but for others it creates waste (see ‘beast theory’ of retentions discussed 
by Abeysekera (2008a)).  
 
5.3 Defects Profiles 
 
Defects arise due to many reasons. These include mistakes of the designers, failures of manufacturers and 
poor workmanship. Defects that arise during construction due to poor workmanship are generally rectified 
before handover. However, workmanship related defects that arise during the defects liability period need 
to be rectified at no extra cost. Ideally, retention moneys should be sufficient to attend to these. Thus 
understanding cost and time impacts of defects is an important issue when setting up retention regimes.  
 
5.4 Performance History 
 
It was mentioned earlier that in general the current usage of retentions does not differentiate between a 
good and a not so good contractor (or subcontractor). They are treated alike with the same retention 
regime imposed on all. This appears to be unfair and wasteful with no reward for good performance. In 
other words, the underlying assumption seems to be that historical performance has no relevance to 
current or future performance. This is an issue that needs further investigation in relation to its link with 
retention regimes. If true, there seems to be a case for imposing the same regime for all contractors. 
Moreover, the link between retentions as an incentive or a disincentive for performance needs to be 
established too.  
 
5.5 Fair Play 
 
Sliding retention regimes as used in NZ are friendly to large contractors who outsource work. Abeysekera 
(2003, 2005) has pointed out that they have the opportunity to leverage retention moneys to create a large 
surplus pool of money by differentiating retention regimes. This may lead to unfair competition (as the 
playing field is not level). Clients who take note of such possibilities might decide to create retention 
regimes so as to minimise such possibilities and thereby create an efficient market structure. 
 
5.6 Security of Payment  
 
This is an important issue for industry. If the payer goes bankrupt, the payee stand to lose all their moneys 
as it is extremely rare for the payer to provide a payment guarantee (Abeysekera, 2008b). Thus the 
quantum of money held is an important concern for payees. Greater the amount of money held by the 
payer, greater is the risk for the payee. Whether what is held is a reasonable reflection of the risks 
involved is unknown. 
 
 
5.7 Value-based Perceptions 
 
Retention is a commodity that has value. It is not uncommon for contractors or clients to trade retentions 
for price discounts either at award or at completion. Retention regimes could be set up in such a way for 
that such exchanges would become a possibility. This then becomes part of business strategy. 
 
5.8 Business Drivers 
 
It must be remembered that it is the payer who sets the retention regime (and not the payee). The payer 
has the power to strategically manipulate it to suit its own business and/or other needs. The payee could 
either reject or respond appropriately. These drivers need to be understood too. For example, the drivers 
of a public body may be quite different to those of a property developer and depending on these 
differences, the types of retention regimes may also be different but not without consequences. Setting 
regimes without a good understanding of the consequences would be futile.  
 
 
6. Retention Regimes and Theories on Retentions: A Way Forward 
 
Given the power that is available to those who set retention regimes as mentioned in 5.8, it is prudent to 
approach the issue of setting up retention regimes from the point of view of those who have the power of 
control by focussing on how retention regimes could be used to achieve their needs. The cash cow theory 
shows that contractors who outsource work could generate positive cash flows by differentiating retention 
regimes. They would therefore set retention regimes in such a way to maximise such needs if desired. The 
adverse effects of such a strategy could be understood through the beast theory. However, if the intentions 
were to use retentions as a strategy for improving performance, steroid theory shows ways of achieving 
this need. Moreover, if retentions were overused, the stress theory explains what might happen. 
Additionally, if the industry were to see some order to problems due to retentions, chaos theory provides 
new insights on how this might be achieved. In short, what these theories of justified beliefs show are that 
depending on the need of those who award projects, a wide variety of retention regimes could be set up to 
achieve their needs. This is an important discovery – a discovery that paves the way to embark on how 
theory building could be approached. 
 
 
7. The Challenge: Embarking on the Journey of Building Theory 
 
The aim of this study was to understand how a rational framework could be developed for setting up 
retention regimes. Given the discovery outlined in section 6.0, a good starting point would be to focus on 
public clients whose needs may be more homogeneous than private clients. If such a study was to be 
commissioned, then it will be necessary to (a) understand drivers of public sector clients (b) establish the 
validity of underlying assumptions related with current practice and (c) assess how retention regimes 
could be developed to achieve their needs. Research methodology and methods that could be adopted are 

















(a) Understand drivers of 
public sector clients in 
relation to retentions 
Select suitable techniques to capture the voice of the customer 
including interviews/questionnaire surveys/archival data analysis 
separating wants from needs 
(b) Establish the validity of 
underlying assumptions 
related to current 
practice 
Establish current practice through case study methodology.  
Synthesise assumptions, set up hypothesis and test for validity 
Develop a methodology to quantify defects in construction projects 
(explore Delphi technique/risk quantification frameworks)  
(c)  Assess how retention 
regimes could be 
designed to achieve 
needs 
Investigate how client drivers could be achieved (indicative examples): 
• Cost minimisation: Cash flow analysis including sensitivity analysis, 
impact of double dipping and feasibility of potential solutions 
• Risk minimisation: Cost impacts of bonds and guarantees and their cost 
effectiveness, defects- profiles and cost impacts 
• Performance improvement: Establish the validity of the steroid theory   
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